The effect of good corporate governance mechanism and leverage on the level of accounting conservatism by Habiba, Habiba
The Indonesian Accounting Review Vol. 6, No. 1, January – July 2016, pages 67 – 80 
67 
 
The effect of good corporate governance mechanism and leverage 
on the level of accounting conservatism 
Habiba1 
 
1, 2 STIE Perbanas Surabaya, Nginden Semolo Street 34-36, Surabaya, 60118, East Java, Indonesia 
 
 
A R T I C L E  I N F O  
Article history: 
Received 29 April 2016 
Revised 10 June2016 
Accepted 14 July 2016 
 
JEL Classification: 
M41 
 
Key words:  
Accounting Conservatism,  
Corporate Governance,  
Institutional Ownership,  
Managerial Ownership,  
Audit Committee, and  
Leverage. 
 
DOI: 
10.14414/tiar.v6i1.572 
 A B S T R A C T  
Accounting conservatism is a condition where a company acknowledges the debts and 
costs more quickly, but on the other hand, the company acknowledges the income and 
assets more slowly. Some factors that can affect the accounting conservatism are stan-
dards changes, corporate governance, and so forth. The purpose of this study is to 
analyze the effect occurring on the variable of accounting conservatism when using 
comprehensive income and income for the current year in manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2012 and 2013. The variables studied are 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the existence of audit committee, the 
number of audit committee meetings, and leverage. The statistical method used in this 
study is multiple regression analysis. The results of this study indicate that institu-
tional ownership, managerial ownership, and the number of audit committee meetings 
do not have significant effect on accounting conservatism when using comprehensive 
income and income for the current year, but the variables of the existence of audit 
committee and leverage have significant effect on accounting conservatism when using 
comprehensive income and income for current the year. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Akuntansi konservatisme adalah suatu kondisi sebuah perusahaan yang mengakui 
utang dan biaya lebih cepat, namun di sisi lain, perusahaan mengakui pendapatan dan 
aset lebih lambat. Beberapa faktor yang dapat mempengaruhi konservatisme akuntansi 
adalah perubahan standar, tata kelola perusahaan, dan sebagainya. Penelitian ini 
bertujuan  untuk menganalisis pengaruh yang terjadi pada variabel konservatisme 
akuntansi ketika menggunakan pendapatan dan laba komprehensif tahun berjalan di 
perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada 2012 dan 2013. 
Variabel yang diteliti adalah institutional ownership, managerial ownership, kebera-
daan komite audit, jumlah pertemuan komite audit, dan leverage. Metode statistik 
yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis regresi berganda. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukkan bahwa institutional ownership, managerial ownership, dan jumlah 
pertemuan komite audit tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap konservatisme akun-
tansi saat menggunakan laba rugi komprehensif dan pendapatan untuk tahun berja-
lan, tetapi variabel keberadaan komite audit dan leverage berpengaruh signifikan ter-
hadap konservatisme akuntansi saat menggunakan pendapatan komprehensif dan 
pendapatan untuk tahun berjalan. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A company is said to be successful if it is able to 
thrive and has a good performance. The company‟s 
performance is reflected in its financial statements. 
Financial information has to be provided by the 
company to stakeholders for decision-making 
processes. Therefore, the financial statements must 
be presented based on the applicable accounting 
standards in order to be useful to the users. Differ-
ent condition and situation will lead the company 
to have freedom in choosing appropriate account-
ing method. 
The disclosure of some violation cases commit-
ted by manufacturing companies provides evidence 
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on the need for quality financial reporting informa-
tion for decision-making. As stated by Luthfiany 
Hikmah (2013) on earnings management per-
formed by PT Kimia Farma, in which the company 
ever inflated its annual net profit as much as IDR 
32.668 billion. Such condition was certainly a bad 
news and detrimental to stakeholders. This oc-
curred because of the poor application of account-
ing conservatism in presenting the financial state-
ments. The need for quality financial statements 
requires management to behave in conservatism or 
apply precautionary principles. 
According to Dinny Prastiwi (2013), conservat-
ism is a principle that acknowledges debt and cost 
immediately, but income and assets are not imme-
diately acknowledged although the possibility is 
big. Conservatism is an accounting principle, in 
which when it is applied, it will create higher costs 
and debt, but on the other side, the income and 
assets become low in the financial statements. 
Broadly speaking, conservatism is very useful to 
predict the condition of a company in the future. 
There are internal factors and external factors 
that can affect the level of accounting conservatism 
in presenting financial statements. Company‟s ex-
ternal factors are related to legal systems and stan-
dards set out in a country. Meanwhile, company‟s 
internal factors include cooperation between man-
agement and internal parties of the company to 
make a commitment in order to provide transpa-
rent, accurate, and non-misleading information to 
investors. It is an implementation of good corporate 
governance. 
The importance of good corporate governance 
can be seen through the existence of annual report 
award program organized by the Financial Services 
Authority (OJK) in 2013. The mechanism done to 
implement good corporate governance can be in 
various ways, such as the presence and activity of 
audit committee, managerial ownership, institu-
tional ownership, the proportion of independent 
commissioner, board size, and so on. In this study, 
the variables used are institutional ownership, ma-
nagerial ownership, the existence of audit commit-
tee, the number of audit committee meetings, and 
leverage. These variables have been studied before 
but the results obtained by one researcher to anoth-
er are still inconsistent. Therefore, it is necessary to 
re-examine these variables further. 
This study uses manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2012 and 
2013. The reason for using manufacturing company 
is because this sector has more data population 
than other sectors and there are complex business 
activities in it. The years are chosen because Indo-
nesia has done International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) convergence since 2012, in which 
the income statement has been changed to compre-
hensive income. Thus it can be seen the impact of 
the implementation of leverage and good corporate 
governance (GCG) mechanism on accounting con-
servatism after the implementation of IFRS using 
comprehensive income and the income for the cur-
rent year.  
Based on some of the above reasons, this study 
aims to find out the effects of the variables of ma-
nagerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit 
committee existence, audit committee meetings, 
and leverage on accounting conservatism using 
comprehensive income and income for the current 
year. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Agency Theory 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) in Intan 
and Puji (2014), agency theory is the relationship 
between the agent (manager) and the principal 
(shareholders) that contains a set of contracts. 
Agency theory is meant to have separation between 
the agent and the principal so that there is potential 
conflict that could affect the quality of earnings 
reported. Therefore, there should be a control me-
chanism that can align the differences in interests 
between the agent and the principal. 
 
Signaling Theory 
According to Reny and Denies (2012), a company is 
motivated to provide information to external par-
ties. The motivation occurs due to the existence of 
information asymmetry. In addition, the informa-
tion asymmetry can also occur when there is a dif-
ference in information between the agent and the 
principal. The signaling theory done by the manag-
er to his subordinates helps reduce the level of in-
formation asymmetry. The signal is done by pro-
viding information that the financial statements 
presented have applied the principles of conservat-
ism in order to produce qualified financial state-
ments 
 
Accounting Conservatism 
A company is sometimes faced with uncertain situ-
ation that can influence the selection in implement-
ing appropriate accounting methods. Under such 
condition, the company prefers to be cautious in 
presenting its financial statements. The figures in 
the financial statements, especially assets and in-
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come, are recorded on the most minimum value to 
reduce the risk of uncertainty. This concept is called 
accounting conservatism. 
There are parties who agree and disagree with 
the conservatism. The parties who do not agree 
assume that conservatism cannot be used as a mea-
suring tool to evaluate the risk of the company by 
the users because it may cause the financial state-
ments to be biased. According to these parties, con-
servatism, at first, presents lower earnings and as-
sets, but in the future, the earnings and assets be-
come high so as not to be conservative. Meanwhile, 
the parties who agree assume that the biased finan-
cial statements aim to prevent the management 
from manipulating earnings and assets by present-
ing them too high. In this way, the conservatism 
helps the users control the management by present-
ing income and assets, which are not overstated. 
 
Good Corporate Governance 
Good corporate governance is in charge of checking 
and balancing both internal and external company 
that aims to ensure that the company performs its 
accountability to all stakeholders and is socially 
responsible for the actions carried out in all of its 
business activities (Jill Solomon 2007: 14). The 
number of fraud cases ever occurred, such as in the 
case of PT Kimia Farma, PT KAI, Enron, and others 
has raised a concern that there has been a failure in 
the company's business strategy and fraudulent 
action committed by the company‟s top-level that 
are not detected in a long period. Weak indepen-
dent oversight, bad company controller, and man-
agement opportunistic action make these problems 
occur repeatedly without being noticed. Hence, 
there came the term of good corporate governance 
(GCG). According to Arief Muhammad Effendi 
(2009), the implementation of GCG may encourage 
the creation of clean, transparent and professional 
management. 
Several principles are set in GCG. As written 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in Muhammad Arief 
Effendi (2009), GCG principles include five things: 
the protection of the rights of the shareholders, 
equitable treatment of all shareholders, role of 
stakeholders, the importance of transparency, and 
the responsibility of the board of commissioners or 
directors. 
 
Leverage 
Leverage is the level of the use of debt to finance 
the company's activities which can be in the form of 
investment, production, and others. The higher the 
level of leverage, the higher the level of risk expe-
rienced by the company. In order to reduce the 
level of risk, the company conducts a variety of 
ways to seek for additional return. 
According to Sugiarto (2009), the use of debt 
provides a good signal, in which the company has a 
good performance. Only very strong companies 
dare to take risk with high levels of debt. The debt 
policy made the company also deals with the agen-
cy theory where there are differences of interest 
between managers and shareholders. The mechan-
ism done by the managers is to prove that the deci-
sion of debt does not solely to waste money but 
dare to take the risk of losing their jobs if they are 
not able to manage the debt optimally. 
 
Relationship between Institutional Ownership 
and the Level of Accounting Conservatism 
Institutional ownership plays an important role in 
the implementation of conservatism and GCG. The 
higher the institutional ownership, the stronger the 
external control of the company and thus reducing 
agency. In addition, high institutional ownership 
further strengthens the monitoring functions of the 
board of the company so that the shareholders' 
interests are protected and can indirectly require 
transparent information from the management of 
the company. According to Dinny Prastiwi (2013), 
high institutional ownership can be used by the 
management as a controlling factor to be able to 
monitor effectively. The conservatism principle is 
indirectly applied by the management because 
there is a strict control from the institutional inves-
tors. Based on the literature, the hypothesis used is: 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional ownership has an effect 
on accounting conservatism when using compre-
hensive income statements. 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional ownership has an effect 
on accounting conservatism when using income 
statements for the current year. 
 
Relationship between Managerial Ownership and 
the Level of Accounting Conservatism 
A conflict can occur between management and 
shareholders, or commonly called agency conflict, 
because of the differences of interest between the 
management and shareholders. Increased mana-
gerial ownership can be used as a way to reduce 
the agency conflict (Crutchley and Hansen: 1989; 
Jensen, Solberg and Zorn: 1992 in Luciana and Me-
lyza 2006). In addition, with the increased percen-
tage of managerial ownership, the manager is mo-
tivated to protect the company by way of increas-
ing the performance and considering the interests 
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of the shareholders. 
According to Dinny Prastiwi (2013), there is a 
relationship between managerial ownership and 
accounting conservatism. Managerial ownership 
has a role as monitoring function in the process of 
financial reporting. High managerial ownership 
will enable to monitor the reporting process of a 
company to reduce the information asymmetry, 
and the level of conservatism is low. Meanwhile, 
low managerial ownership can cause greater agen-
cy conflict and leads to the higher demand for con-
servative financial statements. Based on the analy-
sis and findings of the previous researches, the hy-
pothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Managerial ownership has an effect 
on accounting conservatism when using compre-
hensive income statements. 
Hypothesis 4: Managerial ownership has an effect 
on accounting conservatism when using income 
statements for the current year. 
 
Relationship between the Existence of Audit 
Committee and the Level of Accounting Conser-
vatism 
Audit committee plays a fairly important role in 
achieving good corporate governance because it is 
the representation of the board of commissioners to 
oversee the running of the company (Muhammad 
Arief 2009). The audit committee is also an impor-
tant aspect in terms of the valuation of GCG im-
plementation as it will help the process of monitor-
ing the company's financial statements, especially 
in terms of quality of financial reporting. Some 
principles to achieve the GCG include indepen-
dence, transparency, accountability, responsibility, 
and fairness (Muhammad Arief 2009). 
The audit committee is required to be inde-
pendent and fair or to disclose its performance to 
the public periodically, which includes the annual 
work program, the number of audit committee 
meetings, and others. If the audit committee is able 
to perform its function properly in accordance with 
the principles, it is possible for the management, 
board of directors and commissioners to be careful 
or apply conservatism in presenting financial 
statements. Thus, the good control of the audit 
committee and the conservatism principles applied 
by the company will be able to produce qualified 
financial statements and accurate information (Mu-
hammad Arief 2009). Therefore, the hypothesis put 
forward is: 
Hypothesis 5: Audit committee has an effect on 
conservatism when using comprehensive income 
statements. 
Hypothesis 6: Audit committee has an effect on 
conservatism when using income statements for the 
current year. 
 
Relationship between the Number of Audit 
Committee Meetings and the Level of Accounting 
Conservatism 
There are several characteristics of audit committee 
that can be used as a measuring tool in assessing 
the effectiveness of the performance of audit com-
mittee. The characteristics include the structure of 
audit committee, the audit committee's understand-
ing, the frequency of audit committee meetings, 
and the audit committee activities (Sugeng and 
Aprillya 2010). In general, the inspection and su-
pervision of financial reporting process are con-
ducted by the audit committee. By knowing the 
frequency of audit committee meetings, it will also 
be known the effectiveness of the performance of 
the audit committee. 
Based on the research conducted by Robert 
and Gagaring (2011), the frequency of audit com-
mittee meetings has negative effect on earnings 
management. It means that the higher the frequen-
cy of the audit committee meetings, the smaller the 
earnings management measures. In other words, 
the principles of conservatism applied by the com-
pany are also higher. Based on the analysis and 
findings of the previous researches, the hypothesis 
put forward is: 
Hypothesis 7: The number of audit committee 
meetings has an effect on accounting conservatism 
when using comprehensive income statements. 
Hypothesis 8: The number of committee meetings 
has an effect on accounting conservatism when 
using income statements for the current year. 
 
Relationship between Leverage and the Level of 
Accounting Conservatism 
Leverage is the amount of assets that can be fi-
nanced by debt so that there will be a risk for the 
creditor. When a company is in debt, there will be 
an obligation to repay, both the principal and inter-
est, on a periodic basis. This makes the company 
manager work harder to settle the obligation. 
Some say that debt policy is regarded as an ef-
fort to reduce agency conflict (Sugiarto 2009). The 
option to debt means to be ready with all the risks 
ranging from the risk of the loss of employment to 
the risk of bankruptcy. But the risk may even make 
the company manager feel more persistent that his 
choice to debt is for the purpose of managing the 
company seriously. 
The higher the level of corporate debt, the 
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higher the level of conservatism applied (Dinny 
Prastiwi 2013). If a company has a high debt, the 
creditor is entitled to supervise the company. 
Therefore, hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 9: The level of leverage has an effect on 
accounting conservatism when using comprehen-
sive income statements. 
Hypothesis 10: The level of leverage has an effect 
on accounting conservatism when using income 
statements for the current year. 
The schematic framework of this study can be 
described in Figure 1 and 2. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research Design 
Based on the characteristics and types of data, this 
study is included in archive research, which is 
based on written facts (Nur and Bambang 2002). 
This study is using the publication of data obtained 
from www.idx.co.id. Based on the research objec-
tives, this study can be classified as a deductive 
research, a type of research that aims to test the 
hypothesis through validation theory or theory 
application test in specific situation (Juliansyah 
Noor 2010). This study aims to analyze the effect of 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the 
existence of audit committee, the number of audit 
committee meetings, and leverage on the level of 
accounting conservatism. 
Limitation of the Study 
This study focused only on the scope of discussion 
of the problem formulation based on the theory 
related thereto. This study is limited to manufactur-
ing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Ex-
change in 2012 and 2013. 
 
Identification of Variables 
Based on theoretical basis and research hypothes-
es, the variables used in this study are dependent 
variable and independent variable. The dependent 
variable is accounting conservatism. In addition, 
the independent variables consist of institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, audit commit-
tee existence, audit committee meetings, and leve-
rage. 
 
Operational Definition of Variables 
Variable of Accounting Conservatism 
Conservatism is a principle that acknowledges debt 
and cost immediately, but income and assets are 
not immediately acknowledged although the pos-
sibility is big. The measurement of conservatism is 
carried out in accordance with the research con-
ducted by Givoly and Hayn (2000) in Dariush et al. 
(2013) that uses the accrual measurement. It is the 
difference between net income before depreciation 
and operating cash flow divided by total assets and 
multiplied by negative one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Framework of the First Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Framework of the Second Model 
Accounting Conservatism 
(Comprehensive Income) 
Institutional Ownership 
Audit Committee 
Leverage 
Managerial Ownership 
Audit Committee Meeting 
Accounting Conservatism 
(Income for the Current Year) 
Institutional Ownership 
Audit Committee 
Leverage 
Managerial Ownership 
Audit Committee Meeting 
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Kon_Ak_KOMPRE=
𝑁𝐼_𝐾𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑅𝐸−(𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑅)−𝐶𝐹𝑂
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿  𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇
. (1) 
Description : 
Kon_Ak_KOMPRE = Conservatism using compre-
hensive income. 
Kon_Ak_LRB = Conservatism using income for the 
year. 
NI_Kompre = Net Income from comprehensive in-
come. 
NI_LRB = Net Income from income for the current 
year. 
Depr =  Depreciation. 
CFO = Cash flow from operating activities. 
Total Asset = Total assets during the accounting 
period. 
 
Variable of Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of compa-
ny‟s shares by financial institutions such as insur-
ance companies, banks, pension funds, and bank-
ing investment. The measurement of variables in 
this study is done by way of the percentage of the 
number of institutional shares divided by the num-
ber of shares outstanding (Dinny Prastiwi 2013). 
InstitutionalOwnership=
 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
× 100%. (2) 
 
Variable of Managerial Ownership 
Managerial ownership means that the internal par-
ty or the management participates in the decision 
making. The measurement of variables in this 
study is done by a percentage of the number of 
managerial shares divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (Dinny Prastiwi 2013). 
ManagerialOwnership=
 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑆 ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
× 100%. (3) 
 
Variable of the Existence of Audit Committee 
Audit committee is a group of people in the form of 
a committee created by the board of commissioners 
with the goal to carry out surveillance relating to 
the management of the company. The measure-
ment of this variable is in line with Hamonangan 
and Mas'ud (2006), by forming a dummy variable 
(1) if it is found the existence of an audit committee, 
and (0) if it is not found the existence of an audit 
committee. 
 
Variable of the Number of Audit Committee 
Meetings 
Audit committee meeting is the frequency of meet-
ings conducted by the audit committee with the 
purpose of discussing their annual report to the 
board of directors and related to the internal con-
trol of the company. The measurement of this vari-
able is done by looking at the frequency of meet-
ings held within a period of one year or one period 
(Sugeng and Aprillya 2009). 
 
Variable of Leverage 
Leverage is the level of debt done by the company 
to finance its assets as the development of invest-
ment and company‟s business activities. In this 
study, the measurement of this variable is done by 
dividing the total debt with total assets of the com-
pany (Dinny Prastiwi 2013). 
Leverage=
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (4) 
 
Population, Sample, and Sampling Technique 
The population of this study is all manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
in 2012 and 2013. The sample used in this research 
is determined by using purposive sampling me-
thod with certain criteria. The sampling criteria 
includes: (1) the manufacturing companies were 
registered as the public companies in the Capital 
Market Directory Index and matched with the data 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 2012 – 2013; (2) 
the manufacturing companies issued annual re-
ports from 2012 to 2013 in IDR; (3) the manufactur-
ing companies issued financial statements ending 
on December 31 in IDR, (4) the manufacturing 
companies had complete data as required in this 
study 
 
Data and Data Collection Method 
The data used in this research are secondary data in 
the form of annual reports and financial statements 
of manufacturing companies listed on the Indone-
sia Stock Exchange 2012-2013 obtained from the 
official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange, 
(www.idx.co.id). 
 
Data Analysis Techniques 
The data analysis techniques used are descriptive 
analysis of data, normality test, multiple regression 
analysis and hypothesis testing to test the effect of 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, the 
existence of audit committee, audit committee 
meeting and leverage on the level of accounting 
conservatism using comprehensive income and 
income for the current year. The steps are as fol-
lows: 
 
Descriptive Statistic Test 
Descriptive statistics is a description of data seen 
from the mean value, standard deviation, maxi-
mum value and minimum value. Descriptive statis-
tic test is performed using SPSS 22. 
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Normality Test 
The purpose of normality test is to test whether, in 
the regression model, the dependent variable and 
independent variables have normal distribution. 
The regression model that has normal data distri-
bution or near normal can be said that the regres-
sion model is good. Imam Ghozali (2011: 30) ex-
plains that the way to detect normality is using 
residual value observation and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test with the following hypothesis: 
H0: Residual data are normally distributed 
H1: Residual data are not normally distributed 
Conclusion can be drawn by seeing that if the 
Sig value ≥ 0.05, then H0 is accepted, and if the Sig 
value < 0.05, then H0 is rejected 
 
Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is performed to test the 
strength of the relationship between two or more 
variables. Additionally, Imam Ghozali (2011: 96) 
explains that the regression analysis shows the di-
rection of the relationship between independent 
variable and dependent variable. This study uses 
Multiple Linear Regression analysis as the data 
analysis technique. This analysis is mathematically 
written with the following equation: 
Kon_Ak_Kompre =  + β1INS+ β2MAN + β3KKA + 
β4RKA+ β5 LEV+ ε. (5) 
Kon_Ak_LRB =  + β1INS+ β2MAN + β3KKA + 
β4RKA+ β5 LEV+ ε. (6) 
Where: 
Kon_Ak_Kompre = Conservatism of Comprehensive 
Income 
Kon_Ak_LRB = Conservatism of Income for the cur-
rent year 
INS = Institutional Ownership 
MAN = Managerial Ownership 
KKA = Existence of Audit Committee 
RKA = Number of Audit Committee Meeting 
Lev = Leverage 
 = Constant 
β1-5 = Regression Coefficient 
ε = Variable of disruptor. 
 
Hypothesis Testing Techniques 
F Statistic Test 
F test is used to indicate whether the regression 
model is fit or not fit. If the value of Sig-F <0.05, 
then H0 is rejected (model is fit). Conversely, if the 
value of Sig-F ≥ 0.05, then H0 is accepted (model is 
not fit). 
 
Determination Coefficient (R2) 
Determination coefficient (R2) is basically used to 
find out the influence of the independent variable 
(X) on the dependent variable (Y). R2 value is 
ranging from 0 to 1. If R2 = 1, it means that the in-
dependent variable has a perfect relationship with 
the dependent variable. The higher the R2 value 
(approaching 1), the better the regression. If R2 = 0, 
it means that there is no relationship between de-
pendent variable and independent variable. Small-
er R2 value (approaching 0) indicates that the inde-
pendent variable specified is not able to explain the 
variation of the dependent variable changes. 
 
T Statistic Test 
The t statistic test, basically, indicates whether par-
tially there is a real effect between dependent vari-
able (Y) and independent variable (X). If the value 
of Sig-t <0.05, then H0 is rejected or it can be said 
that the variables of institutional ownership, mana-
gerial ownership, the existence of an audit commit-
tee, the audit committee meetings, and leverage 
have an effect on accounting conservatism using 
comprehensive income and the income for the year. 
Meanwhile, if the value of Sig-t ≥ 0.05, then H0 is 
accepted or it can be said that the variables of insti-
tutional ownership, managerial ownership, the 
existence of an audit committee, the audit commit-
tee meetings, and leverage have no effect on ac-
counting conservatism using comprehensive in-
come and the income for the year. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Description of Research Analysis 
This study is related to good corporate governance 
(GCG) and leverage with the research subject of 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2012 and 2013 using com-
prehensive income and the income for the year. 
Based on the data obtained from IDX and by 
using measurements of comprehensive income and 
the income for the year, there are 300 manufactur-
ing companies listed on the Capital Market Directo-
ry Index from 2012 to 2013. Of the 300 companies, 4 
companies are not included in the research sample 
because they are not listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Three companies are listed on IDX but 
they do not publish financial statements and annual 
report per December 31. 11 companies are listed on 
IDX but they do not publish annual report. 60 com-
panies are listed on IDX but they publish financial 
statements in dollar. In addition, 29 companies are 
listed on IDX but they do not have complete data. 
After the elimination, it is obtained as many as 193 
manufacturing companies consisting of 90 compa-
nies in 2012 and 103 companies in 2013. 
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Data Analysis 
Descriptive Analysis 
A thorough description on the characteristics of the 
main variables can be done using descriptive statis-
tics: 
In table 1, from the accounting conservatism 
using comprehensive income is obtained minimum 
value of -0.32 derived from PT. Steel Pipe Industry 
of Indonesia in 2012 and a maximum value of 0.31 
is derived from PT. Intraco Penta in 2013. The mean 
value of the level of conservatism using compre-
hensive income between 2012 and 2013 is 0.0422 
with a standard deviation of 0.09215. In this study, 
the data variation is high because the values of 
standard deviation are above average. 
The minimum value of conservatism using in-
come for the year is -0.29 derived from PT. Steel 
Pipe Industry of Indonesia in 2012 and PT. Alu-
mindo Light Metal Industry Ltd. in 2013. The 
maximum value of 0.31 is derived from PT. Intra-
co Penta in 2013. When using the income for the 
year, the mean value of the level of conservatism 
in 2012 and 2013 is -0.0346 which is higher than 
the conservative using comprehensive income. 
This is presumably due to the convergence of In-
donesian Financial Accounting Standard (PSAK) 
to IFRS standards which led some companies to 
reduce the level of conservatism. This study has a 
standard deviation of 0.09067, or above the aver-
age, in which it can be said that the data variation 
in this study is high. 
Institutional ownership has the main value of 
69.3474 with a standard deviation of 21.23364 
which means that the range or the distance between 
one data and another is 21.23364. The standard 
deviation which is smaller than the average shows 
that the variation of institutional ownership is rela-
tively low with a minimum value of 0.00 derived 
from PT. Intan Wijaya International in 2012 and 
2013, while the maximum value of 98.96 is derived 
from PT. Bentoel International Investama in 2012 
and 2013 
The lowest value of managerial ownership is 
0,000 derived from 97 companies in 2012 and 2013, 
which means that more than 50% of the samples do 
not have managerial ownership structure. The max-
imum value of managerial ownership is 48.28 de-
rived from PT. Hanson International in 2013, which 
means that this company has the managerial own-
ership higher than the public ownership. The mean 
value of managerial ownership is 2.4535 with a 
standard deviation of 6.03886, which means that 
the data variation is high. 
From Table 1, the existence of audit commit-
tee has a mean value of 0.99, with a standard dev-
iation of 0.102, which means that the range or the 
distance between one data and another is 0.102 
and the variation is fairly low. Table 2 is the result 
of analysis of the frequency of distribution of the 
audit committee: 
Based on Table 2, there are 191 manufacturing 
companies from a total of 193 manufacturing com-
panies in 2012 and 2013 that have audit committee, 
or 99%. While the remaining two companies, or 1%, 
do not have audit committee. The lowest audit 
committee meeting is 0, or no meeting, and the 
highest is 37 meetings. The mean value of audit 
committee meeting is 5.54 with a standard de-
 Table 1 
Results of Descriptive Analysis  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
% INS 193 .00 98.96 69.347 21.234 
% MAN 193 .00 48.28 2.454 6.039 
KKA 193 .00 1.00 .990 .102 
RKA 193 .00 37.00 5.540 5.389 
LEV 193 .04 2.88 .496 .322 
Kon_Ak_KOMPRE 193 -.32 .31 -.042 .092 
Kon_Ak_LRB 193 -.29 .31 -.035 .091 
Valid N (listwise) 193     
Source: Processed SPSS. 
 
Table 2 
Results of Statistic Test of the Frequency of KKA 
Category Frequency Percent 
Without Audit Committee 2 1.0 
With Audit Committee 191 99.0 
Total 193 100.0 
Source: Processed SPSS. 
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viation of 5.389 which means that the data variation 
is fairly low. 
The mean value of leverage is 0.4960 with a 
standard deviation of 0.32171. Data variation of 
leverage can be said to be low because the stan-
dard deviation is smaller than the mean value. 
The minimum value of this variable is 0.04 oc-
curred on PT. Jaya Pari Steel in 2013 and PT. Ker-
tas Basuki Rachmat Indonesia in 2012, which 
means that the lowest ability of the companies to 
finance their assets using debt is 4%. Meanwhile, 
the maximum value is 2.88 occurred on PT. Prima-
rindo Asia Infrastructure in 2013. This means that 
the highest ability of companies to finance their 
assets with a loan is 2.88 or exceeds the value of 
assets. 
 
Normality Test 
Normality test is necessary because the regression 
model can be said “good” if it is normally distri-
buted or near normal (Ghozali 2011: 160). In this 
study, the normality test is conducted using statis-
tical analysis with the method of one sample kol-
mogorof Smirnov test. The data is said to be normal 
if the significance value is above 0.05. Table 3 and 4 
are the results of the normality test using Kolmogo-
rov-Smirnov Test: 
Based on the results of statistical tests in Table 
3 and 4, the significance value of Kolmogorov 
Smirnov is 0.200, greater than the confidence level 
of 0.05, so it can be said that the data is normally 
distributed. 
 
Hypothesis Test of Multi Linear Regression 
Analysis 
Based on Table 5, it is obtained F value of 2.673 
with a significance level of 0.023. While in table 6, 
it is obtained F value of 2.535 with a significance 
level of 0.030. Both models have a significance 
level of F below 0.05, which means that the regres-
sion model fits to the data of the study. The value 
of adjusted R2 in Table 5 is 0.042 and 0.038 in Ta-
ble 6. This indicates that the variable of the level of 
accounting conservatism (using comprehensive 
income), which can be explained by the variables 
of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, 
the existence of an audit committee, audit commit-
tee meetings and leverage is 4.2%, while the re-
maining 95.8% is explained by other variables 
which are not examined in this study. Likewise, 
from Table 6, it can be concluded that the variable 
of the level of accounting conservatism (using the 
income for the current year), which can be ex-
plained by the variables of institutional owner-
ship, managerial ownership, the existence of audit 
committee, audit committee meetings and leve-
Table 3 
Results of Normality Test of the First Model 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 193 
Normal Parameters a,b Mean .000 
Std. Deviation .098 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .049 
Positive .034 
Negative -.049 
Test Statistic .049 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200c,d 
Source: Processed SPSS. 
 
Table 4 
Results of Normality Test of the Second Model 
 Unstandardized Residual 
N 193 
Normal Parametersa,b Mean .000 
Std. Deviation .098 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .039 
Positive .037 
Negative -.039 
Test Statistic .039 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .200c,d 
Source: Processed SPSS. 
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rage is 3.8%, while the remaining 96.2% is ex-
plained by other variables which are not examined 
in this study. 
 
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Ac-
counting Conservatism using Comprehensive 
Income and the Income for the year 
Based on the analysis in Table 5 and Table 6, the 
regression coefficient for institutional ownership 
is 0.001. It shows that every addition of institu-
tional ownership is 1%. In addition, if other va-
riables are considered constant, it will increase the 
level of conservatism of 0.001. From Table 6, it is 
known that the t value is 1.538 with a significance 
level of 0.126. It can be concluded that H0 is ac-
cepted, which means that institutional ownership 
has no effect on conservatism when using com-
prehensive income. Meanwhile, the t value in Ta-
ble 6 is 1.438 with a significance level of 0.152. 
From the results, it can be concluded that H0 is 
accepted or the institutional ownership has no 
effect on accounting conservatism when using the 
income for the year. 
The results of this study are consistent with 
research by Dinny Prastiwi (2013), in which the 
results are not able to prove the influence of insti-
tutional ownership on accounting conservatism. 
This is presumably due to the absence of good 
monitoring function by institutional party on per-
formance of management in the preparation of 
financial statements. In addition, the institutional 
party tends to expect a high return and has no 
sense of belonging to the company. So, large insti-
tutional ownership is not a guarantee that the 
management will perform accounting conservat-
ism. 
Both models result in the same conclusion. In-
deed, conservatism has existed before 2012 or be-
fore the application of IFRS standards. Descriptive 
statistically, the convergence of standards makes 
the level of conservatism increased after 2012. In 
fact, according to Thomas S. (2006), the essence of 
corporate governance is that the company's per-
formance increases by way of monitoring the per-
formance of management. However, institutional 
ownership has no effect on accounting conservat-
ism caused by low monitoring function by institu-
tional party. 
Table 5 
Results of Multi Linear Regression of the First Model 
Variable 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -.217 .077  -2.828 .005 
% INS .001 .000 .120 1.538 .126 
% MAN .000 .001 .011 .135 .892 
KKA .172 .071 .172 2.415 .017 
RKA .000 .001 -.006 -.083 .934 
LEV .048 .023 .152 2.116 .036 
Adjusted R2 0.042 
F  2.673 
Sig F 0.023 
Source: Processed SPSS. 
 
Table 6 
Results of Multi Linear Regression of the Second Model 
Variable 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -.180 .076  -2.360 .019 
% INS .001 .000 .113 1.438 .152 
% MAN .000 .001 -.006 -.079 .937 
KKA .144 .071 .145 2.027 .044 
RKA 0.000066 .001 .004 .050 .960 
Lev .052 .023 .165 2.285 .023 
Adjusted R2 0.038 
F  2.535 
Sig F 0.030 
Source: Processed SPSS. 
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The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Account-
ing Conservatism Using Comprehensive Income 
and the Income for the Current Year 
Base on Table 5 and Table 6, the value of regres-
sion coefficient is 0.000, which means that every 
addition of managerial ownership is 1%. In addi-
tion, if other variables are considered constant, it 
will increase the level of conservatism of 0.000. 
From Table 5, it is known that t value is 1.35 with 
a significance level of 0.892. It can be concluded 
that H0 is accepted, which means that institution-
al ownership has no effect on conservatism using 
comprehensive income. While from Table 6, it is 
known that t value is -0.079 with a significance 
level of 0.937, which means that H0 accepted or 
managerial ownership has no effect on account-
ing conservatism using the income for the year. 
From the analysis of the t test of the first model 
and the second model, it is found that managerial 
ownership has no effect on accounting conservatism. 
This study is able to prove the agency theory pro-
posed by Intan and Puji Harto (2012) that the separa-
tion of functions between the manager and the own-
er possibly results in the agency conflict due to the 
more information owned by the agents rather than 
the shareholders. Therefore, it is likely that the com-
pany does not apply high accounting conservative. 
The results of this study are consistent with the 
research by Angga Alfian and Arifin (2012) which 
are not able to prove the effect of managerial own-
ership on accounting conservatism. This is presum-
ably because of the low portion of managerial own-
ership based on descriptive statistics. Managers 
tend to report non-conservative earnings because 
they have less sense of belonging of the company. 
Besides, the low portion of managerial ownership 
means that the managers tend to give priority to 
pursue the bonus rather than to give priority to the 
interests of the owner of the company. 
When using comprehensive income and the in-
come for the year, managerial ownership has no 
effect on accounting conservatism, although the 
concept of conservatism has existed before 2012 or 
before the convergence of standards. This means 
that even though there is convergence of Indone-
sian financial Accounting Standard (PSAK) to IFRS, 
the managerial ownership has no effect on conser-
vatism due to the agency conflict and the tendency 
of managers to pursue bonus. 
 
The Effect of the Existence of Audit Committee on 
Accounting Conservatism using Comprehensive 
Income and Income for the Current Year 
Based on Table 5, it is known that the value of 
regression coefficient is 0.172, which means that 
every addition of the existence of an audit com-
mittee is 1%. In addition, if other variables are 
considered constant, it will increase the level of 
conservatism (comprehensive income) of 0.172. 
Meanwhile, from Table 6, it is known that the val-
ue of the regression coefficient of the existence of 
audit committee is 0.144, which means that every 
addition of the existence of the audit committee is 
1%. In addition, if other variables are considered 
constant, it will increase the level of conservatism 
(income for the current year) of 0.144. From Table 
5, it is known that t value is 2.415 with a signific-
ance level of 0.017, which means that the existence 
of audit committee has an effect on conservatism 
using comprehensive income. While from table 6, 
it is known that t value 2.027 with a significance 
level of 0.044, which means that the existence of 
audit committee has an effect on conservatism 
using income for the current year. 
From the analysis of t test of the first model 
and the second model, it is found that audit com-
mittee has an effect on accounting conservatism. 
The results can prove the principles of good cor-
porate governance expressed by Thomas S. (2006) 
regarding the responsibility. The application of 
the principles of good corporate governance re-
garding responsibility implies that the company 
management must adhere to the applicable legis-
lation. 
Both models result in the same conclusion that 
both equally have an effect on conservatism when 
using comprehensive income and income for the 
year. This means that even though there is conver-
gence of IFRS, the companies remain adherent to 
Capital Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam) to 
establish an audit committee. However, these re-
sults are not consistent with the research by Dinny 
Prastiwi (2013) which states that the existence of 
audit committee has no effect on accounting con-
servatism. 
 
The Effect of Audit Committee Meeting on Ac-
counting Conservatism using Comprehensive 
Income and Income for the Current year 
Based on Table 5, the variable of audit committee 
meeting has a regression coefficient of 0.000, 
which means that every addition to the audit 
committee meeting is 1%. In addition, if other va-
riables are considered constant, it will increase the 
level of conservatism (comprehensive income) of 
0,000. While based on Table 6, this variable has a 
regression coefficient of .000066, which means that 
every addition to the audit committee meeting is 
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1%. In addition, if other variables are considered 
constant, it will increase the level of conservatism 
(income for the year) of 0.000066. From Table 5, it 
can be known that t value is -0.083 with a signific-
ance level of 0.934. While from Table 6, it can be 
known that t value is 0.050 with a significance 
level of 0.960. From the two results, it can be con-
cluded that the variable of audit committee meet-
ing has no significant effect on accounting conser-
vatism using comprehensive income and the in-
come for the year. 
Audit committee meeting has no effect on ac-
counting conservatism. This is presumably due to 
several reasons, such as the companies do not dis-
close the frequency of audit committee meetings, 
the companies hold audit committee meetings less 
than four times in a year, and the companies hold 
meetings more than four times in a year. 
The first reason, there are still companies that 
do not disclose the frequency of audit committee 
meetings. This means that the companies do not 
apply the principles of transparency and good cor-
porate governance as expressed by Thomas S. 
(2006). There are 33 companies that did not disclose 
the frequency of audit committee meetings, or ap-
proximately 17.09%. In this case, it means that the 
company‟s GCG is weak and this results in low 
conservatism. 
The second reason, there are still companies 
whose frequency of audit committee meeting does 
not follow the regulation of Capital Market Super-
visory Agency (Bapepam) that is at least four times 
a year. As said by Anggita and Aditya (2014), the 
frequency of audit committee meetings in a year is 
at least four times, but there are 20 companies, or 
about 10.36%, that hold audit committee meetings 
less than four times. This is consistent with the re-
search conducted by Anggita and Aditya (2014) 
that is unable to prove the effect of the frequency of 
audit committee meetings on the level of com-
pliance of disclosure. 
The third reason, there are companies that hold 
audit committee meetings more than four times a 
year. There are about 140 companies of 193 sam-
ples, or approximately 72.53%, that hold audit 
committee meetings more than four times a year. 
Actually, the regular meetings of audit committee 
are expected to reduce acts of fraud committed by 
management. However, the results in this study 
show that there is no influence between the number 
of audit committee meetings and accounting con-
servatism. The reason that can be used to explain it 
is that the duties and responsibilities of the audit 
committee are still less maximum so their role in 
the company is not effective. As in the study con-
ducted by Sugeng and Aprillya (2010), who studied 
on the effect of the frequency of audit committee 
meetings on earnings management, stated that 
there is a possibility that the management and the 
external auditors rarely attend audit committee 
meetings. The impact is that the problem faced by 
the management can not be fully understood by the 
audit committee. This will lead to the problem in 
the financial reporting process. 
 
The effect of Leverage on Accounting Conservat-
ism using Comprehensive Income and Income for 
the Current Year 
Based on Table 5, it can be seen that the regression 
coefficient for the variable of leverage is 0.048, 
which means that every addition to leverage is 
1%. In addition, if other variables are considered 
constant, it will increase the level of conservatism 
(comprehensive income) of 0.048. While base on 
table 6, the value of regression coefficient for the 
variable of leverage is 0.052, which means every 
addition to leverage is 1%. In addition, if other 
variables are considered constant, it will increase 
the level of conservatism (income for the year) of 
0.052. 
This research finds that leverage has significant 
effect on accounting conservatism good when ei-
ther using comprehensive income or income for the 
current year. The results of this study are consistent 
with the research by Ni Kd and I Ketut (2014) 
which stated that leverage has significant effect on 
accounting conservatism. Creditors tend to require 
companies to be conservative in preparing the fi-
nancial statements. Creditors who provide loans 
are the party who are not willing to be harmed so 
they demand greater rights to monitor and deter-
mine the management of operations and company 
accounting for the security of their funds. 
Leverage has an effect on accounting conser-
vatism when using comprehensive income and 
income for the current year. Increasing number of 
industries make the company think more about 
sustainability in the long term, such as establish-
ing of new factories or new branches, upgrading 
technology, providing training for employees, and 
others. The company must obtain large funds and 
does not just rely on loans from individuals or 
institutions in the country but could involve for-
eign parties. The convergence of Indonesian Fi-
nancial Accounting Standard (PSAK) to Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) also 
increase the supervision of the creditors, especial-
ly foreign creditors and the control is much more 
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stringent than before the application of IFRS con-
vergence. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Based on the results of the regression analysis (t-
test) in the first model and the second model, it can 
be seen that institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, and audit committee meeting do not 
have significant influence on accounting conservat-
ism when using comprehensive income and the 
income for the year. Meanwhile, the variables of the 
existence of audit committee and leverage have 
significant effect on accounting conservatism when 
using comprehensive income and the income for 
the year. It can be concluded that although there 
has been a convergence of IFRS since 2012, the use 
of conservatism is still maintained at certain as-
pects. 
This study has several limitations, such as (1) 
the study period is very short i.e. 2012 and 2013. It 
is because Indonesia just implemented the conver-
gence of standard in 2012, (2) the accounting con-
servatism in this study only uses the accrual mea-
surement so that it cannot be compared with using 
one measurement. The suggestion put forward in 
this study is that for further researchers to extend 
the period of the study and use other measure-
ments for conservatism such as market measure-
ment or other measurements to make it more com-
parable. 
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